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WHAT IS "LIKE-KIND"
— by Neil E. Harl*
The popularity of like-kind exchange treatment has grown in recent years as the rules
have become more certain1 and values of assets have risen relative to the income tax
basis in those assets.  However, a particularly troublesome question for some farm and
ranch property is what is considered "like-kind" for purposes of the statutory provision.
In particular, concern has been raised over what is considered like-kind for purposes of
transfers involving center pivot irrigation systems, specialty storage facilities and
similar types of structures.
General rule
The statute merely refers to "…property held for productive use in a trade or business
or for investment…exchanged solely for property of like kind."2  The regulations
distinguish between "real property" and "depreciable tangible personal property."3  As
the regulations note, "depreciable tangible personal property" held for productive use in
a trade or business or for investment may be exchanged for property of a like-kind or
like class.4
Unfortunately, the regulations under the like-kind exchange statute, I.R.C. § 1031, do
not define "depreciable tangible personal property."5  However, the term "personal
property" is defined for purposes of I.R.C. § 1245 relating to depreciation recapture
as—
"(1) tangible personal property (as defined in paragraph (c), of § 1.48-1, relating to
the definition of 'section 38 property' for purposes of the investment credit), and (2)
intangible personal property."6
The regulations under I.R.C. § 48, in turn, define "tangible personal property" to
mean—
"…any tangible property except land and improvements thereto, such as buildings
or other inherently permanent structures (including items which are structural
components of such buildings or structures).  Thus, buildings, swimming pools,
paved parking areas, wharves and docks, bridges and fences are not tangible
personal property. Tangible personal property includes all property (other than
structural components) which is contained in or attached to a building.  Thus, such
property as production machinery, printing presses, transportation and office
equipment, refrigerators, grocery counters, testing equipment, display racks and
shelves, and neon and other signs, which is contained in or attached to a building
constitutes tangible  personal  property  for purposes of the credit allowed by
section 38.  Further, all property which is in the nature of machinery (other than
structural components of a building or other inherently permanent structure) shall
be considered tangible personal  property  even  though  located  outside a building.
_____________________________________________________________________________
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Thus, for example, a gasoline pump, hydraulic car lift, or
automatic vending machine, although annexed to the
ground, shall be considered tangible personal property."7
Center-pivot systems
Based on the language in the regulations,8 it is fairly clear that
a center pivot irrigation system is depreciable tangible personal
property and can be exchanged for property of a like-kind or
like class.9
Returning to the definition of "tangible personal property" in
the regulations,10 the electrical and plumbing connections of a
center pivot system are comparable to those of a gasoline pump
or a hydraulic car lift, both of which are included as examples
in the regulations.11  Moreover, the case law supports the
conclusion in comparable settings that such items are "tangible
personal property."  Thus, the term includes air conditioning
units to meet temperature and humidity requirements;12 p opane
storage tanks;13 photo labs (but not concrete foundations);14
bulk tanks and storage tanks used in bulk petroleum distribution
and retail operations;15 fire extinguishers;16 fixed or floating
docks (but not pilings);17 construction site trailers;18 billboards,
signs, lighting fixtures and detachable poles at retail gas
stations (but not concrete foundations);19 and bank vault doors,
record vault doors, night depository facilities and walk-up and
drive-up teller's windows (but a drive-up teller's booth was a
building).20
As for what is "like-kind" for depreciable personal property,
depreciable personal property is classified into 13 general asset
classes.21  The classes are listed in the IRS publication for
determining classification for depreciation purposes as asset
classes 00.11 through 00.28 and 00.4.22  Depreciable personal
property that is not classified with any of the 13 general asset
classes is classified into four digit product classes.23  Prop rties
within the same product class generally are of a like class.24
Much of the personal property used in a farm business is
included in product class 3523, Farm Machinery and
Equipment.  Thus, an exchange of farm machinery for farm
machinery is like kind.
Specialized storage structures
The like-kind exchange treatment of specialized storage
structures and similar facilities is less straightforward.
The regulations state that "one kind or class of property may
not, under I.R.C. § 1031 be exchanged for property of a
different kind or class.”25  If a specialized storage structure (or
similar facility) is deemed to be real property, the structure may
be exchanged for other real property.26  A s ructure classified as
a "building" should be eligible for such exchange treatment as
real property.
By contrast, a structure classified as "depreciable tangible
personal property" should be exchangeable in a like-kind
transfer under the general asset class rules or the product class
rules.27  There is, indeed, some authority indicating that a
specialized storage structure could be so classified, with the
classification decision dependent upon the facts and
circumstances of each situation.  It is pointed out that various
courts have stated that the term "tangible personal property" is
not to be defined narrowly and includes "assets necessary to the
operation of a business."28  Thus, photo labs (but not their
concrete foundations) have been held to be tangible personal
property.29  Construction site trailers have been held to be
tangible personal property.30  In contrast, a bank teller's booth
has been held not to be depreciable personal property but rather
was deemed to be a building.31  The question is not so much an
issue of the functional use of the structure, but whether the
structure is a permanent improvement to the land.32
The "other property" classification
The remaining question is the proper classification for like-
kind exchange treatment purposes of structures and other
property coming within the "other property" category of I.R.C.
§ 1245.33  The like-kind exchange regulations do not address
that issue, unfortunately.  There is no doubt that specialized
storage structures and like kinds of facilities are eligible for
like-kind exchange treatment so long as held for productive use
in a trade or business or are held for investment.34  The question
i  on  of classification.
There is no evidence that Congress intended to embrace the
"other property" branch of I.R.C. § 124535 for purposes of the
like-kind exchange rules.36  The reason reliance was placed on
I.R.C. § 1245 was that the regulations under I.R.C. § 1031 refer
to "pers al property" and "depreciable tangible personal
property."37  I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(A) refers to "personal
property."  At no point is reference made to "other property" (or
to I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(B)) in the like-kind exchange statute or
the regulations.  Moreover, no ruling or case has been located
that incorporates I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(B) (the "other property"
provision) into the like-kind exchange rules.
Further, there appears to be no compelling policy reason for
including the "other property" language in the like-kind
exchange rules.  As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
stated,38 the tests for "other property" are—(1) the property
mu t qualify initially as tangible property of the type intended
by Congress to be covered; (2) it must not be a building; and (3)
it must not be a structural component of a building.  Quite
clearly, tests 2 and 3 are not important in classifying specialized
structures; test 1 is arguable important.  However, no evidence
has been located that Congress intended to include the "other
property" provision under I.R.C. § 1031.
If the "other property" provision is not incorporated into the
like-kind exchange rules, and a particular structure is neither
real property (a building) nor depreciable personal property,
then taxpayers are left with some uncertainty as to what
constitutes "like-kind" property.  The safe approach is that such
a structure could be exchanged for similar kinds of structures
with ut recognition of gain.
In c nclusion
Obviousl , more guidance is needed in the form of rulings,
cases or additional regulations before the breadth of opportunity
for like-kind exchange treatment of specialized structures will
be known with certainty.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
     GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The Chapter 13 debtor owned a one-half
beneficial interest in a trust which owned two pieces of real
property, one of which was used by the debtor as a principal
residence. The interest in the trust had a fair market value of
$24,000 and the debtor claimed $15,000 as exempt under
Section 522(d)(1) as personal property used as a residence. The
court held that the exemption was not allowed because (1) the
debtor’s property consisted only of the beneficial interest in the
trust which was personal property, (2) Section 522(d)(1)
required a debtor to live in the personal property claimed as a
homestead, and (3) the debtor did not live in the beneficial
interest in the trust. In re Bowers, 222 B.R. 191 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1998).
   CHAPTER 12    -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CHAPTER 12 BANKRUPTCY EXPIRES
The Congress, on September 30, 1998, failed to take action to
extend Chapter 12 bankruptcy. Therefore, the provision is not
available after that date. In the last minute discussions on the
topic, the House of Representatives refused to allow the
Chapter 12 provision to be removed from the pending
Bankruptcy Reform Bill. The pending legislation would make
Chapter 12 a permanent part of the Bankruptcy Code. Some
believe that the larger bill may pass before Congressional
adjournment; others are less sure. In any event, those seeking
bankruptcy protection after September 30 and until enactment
of legislation on Chapter 12 will need to resort to other
bankruptcy reorganization provisions, notably Chapters 11 and
13. See Harl, Agricultural Law, § 120.08[5][a] (1998); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual, § 13.03[8][d][i] for discussion of
conversion of Chapter 11 and 13 cases to Chapter 12.
POST-CONFIRMATION BORROWING. The debtor’s
confirmed plan established the priority of the secured claims
allowed in the case. The debtor sought permission to borrow
funds for livestock expenses and to grant the lender a
superpriority in the debtor’s collateral which was subject to first
priority liens. The debtor argued that Section 364(d)(1) gave the
court authority to grant the superpriority lien. The court held
that (1) it had no authority to grant superpriority because
Section 364 applied only to estate property and after
confirmation all estate property reverts to the debtor, and (2) the
plan had established the priority of secured claims and that was
binding on the court and debtor. In re Les Ruggles & Sons,
Inc., 222 B.R. 344 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998).
  FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
The Internal Revenue Service has announced that it has
undertaken a new initiative to improve its procedures for
handling bankruptcy cases. The new procedures are intended to
minimize the likelihood that IRS collection actions will
inadvertently violate the bankruptcy laws, to facilitate prompt
correction of any violations that do occur, and to provide an
administrative process for handling any claims for damages
against the IRS that arise from such violations. Ann. 98-89,
I.R.B. 1998-__, __.
AVOIDABLE LIENS . The Chapter 13 debtor sought to
avoid perfected tax liens by arguing that the debtor, acting as
trustee, had the power, under Section 545, to avoid liens.
Section 545(2) makes the trustee a hypothetical bona fide
purchaser of estate property. The debtor argued that, under
I.R.C. § 6323, the trustee was a bona fide purchaser of the
estate property entitled to a higher priority than the tax liens.
The court rejected this argument, although noting that a
minority of courts have agreed with the debtor’s arguments, and
held that the trustee’s status as a hypothetical bona fide
purchaser was not sufficient to be a bona fide purchaser under
I.R.C. § 6323. In re Stangel, 222 B.R. 289 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1998).
